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We consider controllability of two conjugate observables Z and X by two parties with classical
communication. The ability is specified by two alternative tasks, (i) agreement on Z and (ii)
preparation of an eigenstate of X with use of an extra communication channel. We prove that their
feasibility is equivalent to that of key distillation if the extra channel is quantum, and to that of
entanglement distillation if it is classical. This clarifies the distinction between two entanglement
measures, distillable key and distillable entanglement.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd 03.65.Ud 03.67.-a
When two remote parties Alice and Bob want to com-
municate a message over a public channel without dis-
closing it to a third party Eve, it is sufficient for them
to have a resource called a (secret) key, which is a ran-
dom number that is shared by Alice and Bob secretly
from Eve. In quantum mechanics, a (log d)-bit key is
described by a tripartite state
τABE ≡ d−1
d−1∑
i=0
|ii〉〈ii|AB ⊗ ρE (1)
with arbitrary state ρE , where we assume Hilbert space
HA⊗HB⊗HE of systems held by the three parties, with
a standard basis {|i〉A} for HA and {|i〉B} for HB. Quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) protocols enable production
of the key through communication over a quantum chan-
nel and an authenticated public channel. Strictly speak-
ing, they do not provide the state τABE but a state ρABE
very close to τABE . The imperfection is often measured
[1, 2] using the trace norm as
δkey ≡ ‖ρABE − τABE‖. (2)
It is not an easy task to bound δkey against Eve with
unconditional power by considering all of her options in a
QKD protocol. Hence we often invoke the fact that Alice
and Bob could have done a different (virtual) protocol
instead of the actual protocol, at least from Eve’s point
of view.
One of successful approaches [3] is to take an entangle-
ment distillation protocol (EDP) [4] as the virtual proto-
col, which tries to produce a (log d)-ebit maximally en-
tangled state (MES)
|φmes〉AB ≡ d−1/2
d−1∑
i=0
|ii〉AB. (3)
Once its feasibility is proved, the security of the QKD
protocol immediately follows since the task of entangle-
ment distillation is stronger than that of key distillation
[5, 6]. In fact, rather unexpectedly, it was shown [7]
that it is often strictly stronger, and distillable entan-
glement ED(ρAB) is strictly smaller than distillable key
KD(ρAB). This implies that the security of a QKD proto-
col is not necessarily provable by a reduction to an EDP,
and distillation of a wider class of states were proposed
to restore the applicability [2, 7].
On the other hand, the first proof of unconditional
security by Mayers [8] took a quite different approach.
He considered a virtual protocol concerning an observ-
able that is “conjugate” to the key. In contrast to the
EDP approach, here neither the real protocol nor the
virtual one alone can prove the security. Security follows
from the fact that Alice and Bob can freely choose be-
tween the two protocols, which cannot be executed at
the same time. This complementarity approach has been
refined [9, 10] to achieve the simplicity comparable to
the EDP approach. In addition, it has a unique practical
advantage of low demand on the characterization of ap-
paratuses. Recently, this has lead to the security proof
of efficient QKDs using practical sources and detectors
[11, 12].
In this paper, we first show that this complementarity
scenario is not merely a tool to prove the security, but
it captures exactly what the key distillation is, by prov-
ing that there exists a corresponding complementarity
task whenever key can be distilled. Then we also show
that a slightly different complementarity task, aimed at
the same goal but with the available resource restricted,
is equivalent to entanglement distillation. These results
imply that the distillable key KD(ρAB) and the distil-
lable entanglement ED(ρAB) have nice alternative defi-
nitions in the complementarity scenario, which clarifies
the physical meaning of the difference between the two
quantities.
We first formulate the complementarity scenario es-
sentially used in the latest version [10] of the security ar-
guments, which here we call complementary control of a
(log d)-bit observable. We consider a pair of protocols, the
2primary and the secondary, between which Alice and Bob
can choose to execute. The two protocols are roughly de-
scribed as follows. In the primary protocol, they commu-
nicate over a classical channel, and then Alice measures
a (log d)-bit local observable Z, while Bob tries to guess
its outcome. In the secondary protocol, they perform the
same classical communication, but after that Alice tries
to prepare an eigenstate of an observable X , which is
conjugate of Z. In doing so, we allow Bob to help Alice
through an extra quantum (or classical) channel.
More precisely, we require that the choice between
the alternative protocols can be postponed after the
end of the classical communication. At this point, we
assume that the standard basis {|i〉A}i=0,...,d−1 of HA
corresponds to the observable Z. If they choose the
primary protocol, Alice measures HA (system A) on
{|i〉A}i=0,...,d−1 and Bob conducts a local operation on his
entire systems, resulting in the state of systems AB be-
ing
∑
ij pij |ij〉〈ij|AB. The error in this protocol is given
by
δZ ≡ 1−
∑
i
pii. (4)
If they choose the secondary protocol, Alice and Bob co-
operate over the extra channel in order to prepare system
A in state |0X〉A ≡ d−1/2
∑
i |i〉A. When they end up in
state σA, we define its error by
δX ≡ 1− A〈0X |σA|0X〉A. (5)
Of course, it would be meaningless if we allowed Alice to
discard the contents of system A and prepare |0X〉A from
scratch. In order to claim that they really have created
an eigenstate of X , conjugate of Z, we require that their
operation over the extra channel should commute with
the observable Z, namely, it preserves every eigenstate
|j〉A. We call it the nondisturbing condition.
We now show two theorems implying that this scenario
is essentially equivalent to key distillation, as depicted in
Fig. 1. In the proofs, we use the fidelity [13] F (ρ, σ) ≡
‖√ρ√σ‖2 as well as the trace distance. Both measures
are monotone under quantum operations, and they are
related by 2(1 − √F ) ≤ ‖ρ − σ‖ ≤ 2√1− F [14]. The
fidelity is useful because of the existence of extensions
|φρ〉 and |φσ〉 satisfying |〈φρ|φσ〉|2 = F , whereas the trace
distance obeys the triangle inequality. Eq. (5) can be
written as F (σA, |0X〉〈0X |A) = 1− δX .
The security argument in [10] is essentially given by
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If complementary control of a (log d)-bit
observable with errors δZ and δX is possible with an ex-
tra quantum channel, then the primary protocol yields a
(log d)-bit key with imperfection δkey ≤ 2δZ + 2
√
δX .
Proof. Suppose that Alice and Bob run the primary or
the secondary protocol in the presence of Eve, leading to
the final states ρABE =
∑
ij pij |ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ ρ(ij)E or σAE ,
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FIG. 1: Equivalence between complementary control with an
extra quantum channel and key distillation.
respectively. Suppose that, after the secondary protocol,
(a) we measure system A on the basis {|i〉A} to obtain
σ′AE =
∑
i qi|i〉〈i|A⊗ρ(i)E , and then (b) copy the outcome
onto system B, resulting in σ′ABE =
∑
i qi|ii〉〈ii|AB⊗ρ(i)E .
We will show that ρABE and τABE are both close to
σ′ABE .
Since σA ≡ TrEσAE satisfies Eq. (5), there exists a
state τAE ≡ |0X〉〈0X |A ⊗ ρE with F (σAE , τAE) = 1 −
δX , and hence ‖σAE − τAE‖ ≤ 2
√
δX . If we apply the
steps (a) and (b) to state τAE , the final state is an ideal
key τABE = d
−1
∑
i |ii〉〈ii|AB ⊗ ρE . Therefore, ‖σ′ABE −
τABE‖ ≤ 2
√
δX .
Thanks to the nondisturbing condition, σ′AE =
TrB(ρABE), and hence σ
′
ABE =
∑
ij pij |ii〉〈ii|AB ⊗ ρ(ij)E .
Then, direct calculation leads to ‖σ′ABE − ρABE‖ = 2δZ ,
proving Theorem 1.
Next, we show that the opposite direction is also true
if there is no restriction to Eve’s power. Here, we as-
sume the following for Eve with no restriction. Let us
represent the entire data transmitted over the public
communication by variable ω. We assume that Alice,
Bob, and Eve each has the record of ω, and hence HE
is decomposed as HE = ⊕ωH(ω)E . In principle, by us-
ing large auxiliary systems A′ and B′, Alice and Bob
can do the same key distillation coherently without dis-
carding any subsystems. We assume that Eve can col-
lect everything that is not possessed by Alice and Bob.
This ensures that the final state for a particular value
of ω is a pure state |Φ(ω)ρ 〉ABEA′B′ , and the overall state
is ρABEA′B′ = ⊕ωpω|Φ(ω)ρ 〉〈Φ(ω)ρ |. Tracing out systems
A′B′ gives state ρABE = ⊕ωpωρ(ω)ABE .
Now we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If a (log d)-bit key with imperfection δkey
can be distilled against Eve with no restriction, then com-
plementary control of a (log d)-bit observable with an ex-
3tra quantum channel is possible with errors δZ ≤ δkey/2
and δX ≤ δkey − (δkey/2)2.
Proof. We regard the key distillation protocol as the
primary protocol. Then δZ ≤ δkey/2 is trivial. Be-
fore stating the secondary protocol, we need the follow-
ing observations. In the assumption ‖ρABE − τABE‖ =
δkey, τABE may not be a direct sum over ω. But we
can define such a state τ ′ABE = ⊕ωp′ωτ (ω)ABE by ap-
plying decoherence to τABE . Since the same decoher-
ence operation does not alter ρABE , we have ‖ρABE −
τ ′ABE‖ ≤ δkey, or F (ρABE , τ ′ABE) ≥ (1 − δkey/2)2.
Then, there exists an extension of τ ′ABE taking the
form of τ ′ABEA′B′ = ⊕ωp′ω|Φ(ω)τ 〉〈Φ(ω)τ |ABEA′B′ , satisfy-
ing F (ρABEA′B′ , τ
′
ABEA′B′) ≥ (1 − δkey/2)2.
Since τ
(ω)
ABE = d
−1
∑
i |ii〉〈ii|AB ⊗ ρ(ω)E , state |Φ(ω)τ 〉
must be written in the form of d−1/2
∑
i |i〉A|φ(ω)i 〉A′BB′E
with TrA′BB′ |φ(ω)i 〉〈φ(ω)i | = ρ(ω)E , which is independent of
i. This implies the existence of unitaries {U (ω,i)A′BB′} sat-
isfying U
(ω,i)
A′BB′ |φ(ω)i 〉A′BB′E = |φ(ω)0 〉A′BB′E . If we define
U
(ω)
AA′BB′ ≡
∑
i |i〉〈i|A ⊗ U (ω,i)A′BB′ , we see
U
(ω)
AA′BB′ |Φ(ω)τ 〉 = d−1/2
∑
i
|i〉A|φ(ω)0 〉A′BB′E ,
where the state of system A is |0X〉A.
Hence we can construct the secondary protocol as fol-
lows: After the coherent version of the key distillation
protocol, using the record of ω, Alice and Bob apply
U
(ω)
AA′BB′ using an extra quantum channel. The form
of U
(ω)
AA′BB′ obviously satisfies the nondisturbing con-
dition. If the state after the key distillation protocol
was τ ′ABEA′B′ , the protocol would produce |0X〉A ex-
actly. Thus, for state ρABEA′B′ , the output σA should
satisfy A〈0X |σA|0X〉A ≥ (1 − δkey/2)2, namely, δX ≤
δkey − (δkey/2)2.
The two theorems indicate that the complementarity
scenario is a powerful tool for QKD, namely, there is no
fundamental limitation in applying the scenario to prove
the security of QKD protocols. They also show that dis-
tillable key KD(ρAB) [2] of a bipartite state ρAB can
be also defined in the complementarity scenario. Let us
introduce the asymptotic yield of complementary control
YQ, where the subscript signifies that the extra channel is
quantum. We define YQ(ρAB) to be the supremum of real
numbers y with which the following statement holds true.
Starting with ρ⊗nAB, complementary control of a (log dn)-
bit observable is possible with errors (δ
(n)
Z , δ
(n)
X ), where
δ
(n)
Z → 0, δ(n)X → 0, and log dn/n → y for n → ∞. With
this definition, Theorem 1 implies KD(ρAB) ≥ YQ(ρAB)
while Theorem 2 implies KD(ρAB) ≤ YQ(ρAB), leading
to
KD(ρAB) = YQ(ρAB). (6)
Next, let us consider a slightly different scenario, in
which Alice and Bob are allowed to communicate only
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FIG. 2: Equivalence between complementary control with an
extra classical channel and entanglement distillation.
classically in the secondary protocol. Then we can find
a close connection to distillation of the (log d)-ebit max-
imally entangled state defined in Eq. (3), as depicted in
Fig. 2. For output state ρAB, we measure the imperfec-
tion in the distillation task by
δent ≡ ‖ρAB − τentAB‖ (7)
with τentAB ≡ |φmes〉〈φmes|. Then we can prove the follow-
ing.
Theorem 3. If complementary control of a (log d)-bit
observable with errors δZ and δX is possible with an extra
classical channel, then it is possible to distill a (log d)-
ebit maximally entangled state with imperfection δent ≤
4
√
δZ(1− δZ) + 2
√
δX .
Proof. In the primary protocol, Alice and Bob’s opera-
tion after the classical communication can be coherently
done by enlarging the size of systems A′B′, namely, it
can be done by a unitary operation V = VAA′ ⊗ VBB′ .
Let σAA′BB′ be the state after the application of V . The
error δZ implies that
Tr[QcorABσAA′BB′ ] = 1− δZ (8)
where QcorAB ≡
∑
i |ii〉〈ii|AB is the projection onto the
subspace with no errors.
From the state σAA′BB′ , Alice and Bob can undo
the unitary by applying V −1, going back to the state
just after the classical communication. From here, Al-
ice and Bob can choose to conduct the secondary pro-
tocol using the extra classical channel to produce state
ρA = Λ(σAA′BB′), where we write the whole quantum
operation starting from V −1 by a CPTP map Λ. The
error δX implies that
‖Λ(σAA′BB′)− |0X〉〈0X |A‖ ≤ 2
√
δX . (9)
We construct a distillation protocol as follows. Al-
ice and Bob conduct the coherent version of the pri-
mary protocol, resulting in σAA′BB′ . Bob further uses an
4auxiliary system C with dimension d, prepared in state
σC ≡ |0〉〈0|C . He copies the contents of system B onto
system C by unitary U cpyBC : |j0〉BC 7→ |jj〉BC , resulting
in state
σ′AA′BB′C = U
cpy
BC (σAA′BB′ ⊗ σC)U cpy†BC . (10)
Alice and Bob then apply Λ on systems AA′BB′ us-
ing the extra classical channel to achieve the final state
ρ′AC = Λ(σ
′
AA′BB′C).
We now prove that ρ′AC is close to τ
ent
AC . Consider the
state defined by
σ′′AA′BB′C = U
cpy
AC (σAA′BB′ ⊗ σC)U cpy†AC . (11)
with U cpyAC : |j0〉AC 7→ |jj〉AC . Using Eq. (8) and the obvi-
ous relation U cpyACQ
cor
AB = U
cpy
BCQ
cor
AB, we can show [15] that
‖σ′AA′BB′C − σ′′AA′BB′C)‖ ≤ 4
√
δZ(1 − δZ) and hence
‖ρ′AC − Λ(σ′′AA′BB′C)‖ ≤ 4
√
δZ(1 − δZ). (12)
On the other hand, the nondisturbing condition implies
that there is no difference whether we apply U cpyAC before
or after the application of Λ. This leads to
Λ(σ′′AA′BB′C) = U
cpy
AC (Λ(σAA′BB′)⊗ σC)U cpy†AC . (13)
Then, using Eq. (9), we have
‖τentAC − Λ(σ′′AA′BB′C)‖ ≤ 2
√
δX . (14)
Combined with Eq. (12), it proves Theorem 3.
The opposite direction is trivial, and it is stated as
follows (proof omitted).
Theorem 4. If a (log d)-ebit maximally entangled state
with imperfection δent can be distilled, then complemen-
tary control of a (log d)-bit observable with an extra clas-
sical channel is possible with errors δZ ≤ δent/2 and
δX ≤ δent − (δent/2)2.
If we define the asymptotic yield YC(ρAB) with an ex-
tra classical channel as we defined YQ before, Theorems
3 and 4 lead to
ED(ρAB) = YC(ρAB), (15)
which shows that the distillable entanglement ED also
has an alternative definition in the complementarity sce-
nario. Together with Eq. (6), now we see that distill-
able key and distillable entanglement can be regarded as
achievable yields of the same task, carried out under dif-
ferent conditions. This gives a clear distinction between
the two entanglement measures. Both are related to the
potential to carry out two mutually exclusive tasks con-
cerning a pair of conjugate observables Z and X , using
the same classical communication. One task is to share
the value of Z, and the other one is to drive the state into
an eigenstate of X . The latter task naturally requires ad-
ditional communication, and this is where the difference
between the two quantities shows up. If we insist that it
also must be classical and hence both tasks are feasible
with only classical communication, the achievable size of
the observables tallies with the distillable entanglement.
If we place no such requirement, then the achievable size
matches the distillable key. This may be understandable
because if the key is actually distilled, the task for X is
never carried out and hence there is no concern about
what resources are required to carry it out.
We have seen that the complementarity scenario can
explain two of the few operationally-defined entangle-
ment measures, which shows its significance in under-
standing quantum entanglement. It is interesting to see
whether we can also define yet another operationally-
defined measure, entanglement cost [16] in a complemen-
tarity scenario. The task of the complimentary control
defined here is merely one of many possible ways to quan-
tify abilities related to the concept of complementarity,
and it is worth seeking other tasks, for example, the ones
retaining the symmetry between two conjugate observ-
ables.
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